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U.S. and U.K. Interest Rates, 1890-1934:
New Evidence on Structural Breaks
This paper presents econometric evidence on whelher the founding
cf the Fedcriil Reserve in 1914 caused a structural change from level
stationarity to difference stationarity in U.S. and U.K.. short-term
nominal interest rates. We develop new econometric tests that allow
for parameier transitions to test for a break of this kind and under-
take a grid search analysis of dates atid speeds for the change. We
f nd that U.S. nominal interest rales most likely evolved rapidly to
difference stationarity in June 1917, For the Linited Kingdom we
fail to reject the tiull that U.K. interest rate series follow a difference
stationary process over the entire period 1890-1934. Our analysis
differs from previous research on this topic in thai we lake care to
explore statistical uncertainty around parameter estitnates. and in-
corporate higher-order dynamics into our econometric analysis.
THE PERIOD 1890-1933 was a tumultuous time in finan-
cial markets in both the United States and the United Kingdom. The United Stales,
the United Kingdom, and other Furopean countries suffered through World War L
underwent changes in monetary institutions fwith the founding of the Federal Re-
serve System in the United States), and changes in monetary policy regimes and ob-
jectives (for example, the suspension of the gold standard). Monetary economists
have empirically investigated the effect of such changes on the data-generating
proeess describing notninal interest rate tiiovements, A body of empirical literature
has investigated the changing stochastic behavior of short-tertii notuitial interest
rates during the period 1890-1933 in the United States as well as in the United
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Kingdont. This literature has concltided that during tbe period 1890-1910 short-
term tiominal interest rates in both (be United States and tbe United Kingdom fol-
lowed stationary, 1(0), processes, v\'hereas for the period 1920-1933, tbese interest
rates bad become nonstationary, 1(1). processes, Tbe exact time (or date) at which
tbe structural ebange from stationary to nonstationary behavior took place, and tbe
causes of the structural change in tbe data-gencratitig process describing nominal in-
terest rates, has been an area of controversy, Tbe ntost notable statement has been tbe
argument, made by Mimkiw, Miron, and Weil (1987) that the foundittg of the Federal
Reserve System in the United States in 1914 was a ealalyst for tbe structural ebange
in U.S, interest rate bebavior, Rxpanding on this. Barsky et al, (1988) bave argtied
tbat the Federal Reserve also caused a siructural break in the time series behavior of
interest rates in the United Kingdom. Subseqtient empirieal research (focusing pri-
marily on tbe United Slates), qtjestioning previous works on various grounds, has ar-
gued against the 1914 break point for U.S. interest rates, finding otber break point
dates, Wbile little researeb bas been done reexamining the stochastic behavior of
U,K, interest rates, Ibere is reason to suspect a structural break in U.K. sbort-term
nominal interest rates. Consider, for example, the evidence tbat Barsky et al. (1988)
present on the autocorrelations of each series ((heir Table I). For tbe U.S. monthly se-
ries, tbe atitocorreiations for the first subperiod (1890-1910) datnp quickly relative
to tbose for the second subperiod (1920-1933), For the U.K, series there are signifi-
cantly stronger and more persisted autocorrelations in the first sttbperiod. Indeed,
Barsky et al. (I9S8) point out tbat "In the first sample the autocorrelations indicate
that tbe short rate is more persistent in Britain tban it is in the United States,"' but
they fail to investigate the issue any ttn-ther. In (bis paper we provide a more detailed
investigation of (he above issues.
The purpose of this paper is to present new eeoiiometric evidence on the hypothe-
sis ot a structural break in the stochastic processes generating both U.S. and U.K,
sbort-tcrntntiminal interesi rates between 1890:1 and 1934:1, TbroughotU our analy-
sis we utilize the logistic function to model the structtiial break as a transition from
an 1(0) to an 1(1) process. Tbis permits scope in assessing the speed as well as the
timing of any transition. Section I presenis a brief review of tbe literature in this
area. Our statistical analysis follows and has three main seetions. In section 2 we de-
velop new procedures for tesling for a structtiral break from 1(0) lo I(!) and apply
them to U,S. and U.K, short-term nominal interest rates. In section 3 we concentrate
on dating the structural break in (be U.S, series. In Section 4 we use grid search tech-
niques lo illustrate a fundantental difference between the U.S. and U.K. series re-
garding what types of transitions (in terms of spceitic dates and speeds) eannot be
rejected by likelihood ratio lests. Section 5 concltides the paper.
Our results indicate that, with a fully specified dynamic model, a rapid structtiral
break from 1(0) to 1(1) mosl likely occurred in U.S. notriinal interest rates in June
1917. In contrast, for tbe United Kingdotn we fail to tind strong evidenee supporting
any particular type of structural change, or of any change a( all. In litet, we tind no
I, Bursky ctal , l98X,pat;L- I 130,
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evidence against ihc proposition thiit the U,K, interest rate scries was difference sta-
tionary overthe entire period 1890-1934. One possible explanation (orthis is the in-
terest rale smoothing behavior of the Bank of England during this period
documented by Goodfricnd (1988), Our results indicate that we cannot support the
Mankiw, MIroii, and Weil (1987) argument (hat ihc founding of the Federal Reserve
System alone represented a new regime, or the propi>sition of Barsky ct al. (1988)
who argue that the Fed in some way caused a strucuiral break in U.K. interest rates,
l , I J r [ ' R A r [ I R h R l , V l h \ V
It has been proposed (bat monthly U.S. shorl-lcrni nominal interest rates under-
went a structural break from being level slaliouary. 1(0). with a dominant lirst-order
autorcgressive parameter ol' ab.>ut .75. lo approximately difference stationary, l( I),
sometime between the end of 1914 and the middle of 1915: see, for example'
Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987), and Barsky et al. (1988). Mankiw, Miroi. and Weil
(1987) argue thai the change in the stochastic behavior of interest rates was a result
of Ihe founding of ihe Federal Reserve System in 1914 and its implementation of in-
terest rate-smootbing policies,- While agreeing that a change in the stochastic be-
havior of U,S, interest rates took plaee at some time between 1910 and 1920, several
authors have questioned the date: ,see, for example, l-ishe and Wohar (1990). Fishe
{1991). Angelini (1994). and Kool (1995), Fishe and Wohar (1990) lind a .structural
break in either e;irly 1915 (supporting the Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987) resulls)
or in 1912, depending on whether they examine three-month or six-month interest
rates. I'ishe (1991) employed weekly dala for the United States, allowing lor mulli^
pie structural breaks over the sample 1890 to 1933, Break points were reported in
.lanuary 1908 {a period just following the October 1907 linancial crisis), in June
1917 Ul date associated with Federal Reserve Amendments tbal signifieanlly in-
creased the Fed"s operating eapability). and in January 1930, Kool (1995) employs a
recursive method based on Bayesian learning and argues that the results of previous
switching regression (echniques allempting lo date the slruclural cbange in interest
rates are nol robust. His esiimation method yields a switeh to nonstalionarity in late
1917, Angelini reexamines the work of Mankiw, Miron and Weil (1987) and Fishe
and Wobar (1990) and concludes that their results are not robust (o sample periods
and thai there is no evidence of sIrueUiral change in 1914,
While the majorily of authors believe ihat when (he structural change in U.S. in-
terest rates did occur, it oeetirred quite rapidly |for example. Mimkiw, Miron, and
Weil (1987) (bund it highly probable Ihat the structural break in US. interesl rates
look less (han a year to be fully complete|. otber arguments have been proposed re-
garding the speed of the adjustment to a new regime following the loundin" of the
Fed. Willis (1923) and Wicker (1966) note Ibat Ihe Fed was not very aetivt? in its
l i r M t i n i L Ml J u l v l ' J I 4 a i u l l h i . - b a n k s o | x - i i c . l t o r h u s i i i c - s s n i i N o v c m l v r I d , I < ) I 4 .
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early years, with most of ils efforts during the years 1914-1916 being focused on in-
ternal t)rgani/ation. Aficr this initial period however the Fed was able to concentrate
more rest)urces on their interest rate policy that ct)nseqiiently affected the stochastic
behavior of interest rates. RicHcr (1930) and Kool (1995) point out that the Fed did
not provide large amounts of liquidily to the economy until after 1917 when war fi-
nancing became an important concern.
In addition to questions over the timing and speed of the structural change, various
alternative arguments have also been presented lo explain the reason for the struc-
tural change. For example while Pishe and Wohar (1990) support Mankiw, Miron,
and Weil (1987) and Barsky et al. (1988) with respect to the hehavior of the U.S.
three-month interest rale/ they suggest that it was not the founding of the Fed that
changed the behavior of interest rates, but instead ihc reopening of the U.S. bond and
stock markets in November and December of 1914. Moreover, Angelini (1994) notes
that during World War 1 the New York money markci was strongly subjected to the
regulation and control of the Money Market Coinniittec. Ftirther. throughout this pe-
riod major reforms were passed, that according to some writers of the time greatly
affected the functioning of the money market and may have resulted in ;i permanent
change in how this market operated and Itinctioned. Clark (I9S6) ptits forward the
proposition that the changing behavior of interest rates and inliation was a world-
wide phenomenon, resulting from the suspension of the gold standard, beginning in
1914 and ending by September 1917. The World War 1 suspension of the gold stan-
dard was not abrupt, but piecemeal. While the war forced most of the European na-
tions off the gold standard, in the United States it was nominally maintained and it
was not tintil September 1917 that the government began to constrain gold exports in
an effort to restrict gold otitflows. From May 1919 through March 192(1 infUttionary
pressures led to the resumption of gold outflows (see Wicker 1966). Then as gold re-
serves approached mininitim rcqtiirenients, the Fed increased the discount rate in
-lanuary 1920 to 6 percent. Gold inflows followed and in June 1920 the full gold
standard was resumed, until 1933 when fhe United States went off ihc gold standard.
Although il appears quiic plausible ihat the establishment of a new institution such
as the Federal Reserve at the end of 1914 could have IUKI a strong and immediate ef-
fect on market conditions in the United States, it seems very unlikely fhat the infro-
ducfion of fhe Fed would have been fhe catalyst for strucfural change around the
world. Clark (1986) proposes that fhe structtiral change in interest rafe behavior also
fook place in European cotinfries where cenfral hanks had already been in operation
for tnany years. For example, the Bank of England was established in 1694. Barsky
ef ai. (1988) also find a change in the behavior of U.K. interest rates around the same
time as their postulafed change in the behavior of U.S. itiferest rates, and while they
acknowledge thaf fhe U.S. economy was not sufficienfly dominant to have altered
worldwide interest rates, thev argue ajiainst Clark (I9S6) that II was the dissolution
3 . F i s l i eandWohLi r (199(1) a l so tind a bre;ik in 1912 when emplovicig a six-iiiuiilh inieresi rale, casii i ig
doiitii on Ihe M M W h y p o i h c s i s ihai Ihe l-ed wa^ ilie p r imary contr ib i i l ing tac ior c a u s i n g the s tochas i i c be-
havior of inieresi ra les lo d ians je .
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of tbe gold Standard thai ciuisL-d this change. Tbey present a tbcorelical nK>dc] to sup-
port tbeir argument Ibat tbe founding of the I'ed was lhc ultimate cause of tbe world-
wide cbange in interest rale bebavior bccau.se il -niarked lhc beginning of a new era
in wbich all major eounlries had a central bank."""^
Barro (I9H9) and Kool (1995) suggesi a more attructivc expianalion for the struc-
tural cbange in U.S. and U.K, interest rales, as retlcciing tbe beginning of interest
rate targeting. Barro (1989) attributes Ihe regime cbange in the United States to tbe
fact thai the central bank had an ohjeclivc of smoothing interest rales aroutid a ran-
dom walk target to stabilize Ihe economy at some point following the founding of the
Fed. It bas been argued by Kool (1995) thai interest rate targeting in the United
Slates and tbe United Kingdom began at differenl times, albeii for lhc same reason,
namely, the financing of military spending through government borrowing at low in-
terest rates. Kool (1995) finds slrucuiral breaks in 1915 for tbe United Kingdom and
1917 Ibr tbe United States.
2. T I 'STINt i r O R .A TRANSITION I-ROM l(()| TO U 1) IN I I.S. ANU U.K. INTIiRHST RATHS
Many of tbe above cited studies suggesi reasonable argtmienls for a strucltiral
break occurring in U.S. inicresl rates sometime during 1917, rather than 1914. Our
subsequent empirical analysis will examine this issue. Tbe dala for our empirical
analysis are taken from the sef used by Barsky el ul. (1988) and Mankiw. Miron, and
Weil (1987). Tbe U.S. dala series consists of 529 monthly observations on (be three-
month lime loan rale available al New York Cily banks, taken from the Naiionai
Monetary Commission Fimtncial Review, updated tising the Commercial and Finan-
cial Chronicle. Tbe U.K. series consists of 529 monibly obscrvalions on the three-
month rate on hankers" bills available in London aiid laken from tbe Fconomist. This
is the open market rate o\' bankers" bills, nol to be confused with the Bank of Eng-
land's discounl rale, known as tbe bank rale, fisbe and Wohar (1990), among olbers,
qttcstion the rcliabiliiy of (his dala series and note a number of problems with the
U.S. monthly dala sel. We iberefore follow ibeir siratL-gy of analyzing primarily
weekly data for the United States, a series of 1.305 observations beginning in 1909.
For completeness, we also reporl tindings for nionlbly data as well.'
Consider a titne series of inieresi rates modeled as
\) - a, + a.V,(y,x) + (3|^ • , ^ P.-V/TTh; , 4 t:, (I)
where c, are independcnl, identically distribulcti {IID} deviates, and ,S;(y,T) is the lo-
gistic function based on a sample of si/e 7',
4. BarsKy L-I al. IMSS, pai^c I 12?.
5. \-oi- n u i r c d e l a i l s o n i h c s c i n i c r e s l l a l c S L T J C S S O C . M a n k i w . M i r o n . :MKI W e i l ( 1 9 X 7 ) B a i s k v L-1 al
Ivt^K). a n d l - i s h e a n d W x i h a r (IMMIl).
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'; y > 0
that monotonically traverses the interval (O.I). Fquation (1) represetits a model that
allows a smooth transition in v, from one iirst-order autoregression. as / -^ -^.
y, = ai
to another, as / ^ ™,
y, = (aj + a,) + (P, + p.)y, i + e, -
The interpretation of the parameters of S,(y.x) is as follows. The parameter T deter-
mines the timing of the transition midpoint fraction because, for y > 0, we have
S-M-T) = 0, 5, JY,T) = I,and5^;(y,t) = 0,5. The speed of the transition is then tJe-
termined by the paratneter y. If y is small, then S,(jj) takes a long period of time to
traverse the interval (0,1), and in the limiting case with y = 0, S,ly,x) = 0.5 for all /,
On the other hand, for large values of y, S,iy.x) traverses the interval (0,1) very
rapidly, and as y approaches t>= this function changes value frorn 0 to I instanta-
neously at time t = \T. Thus the model allows for no transition, instantaneous tran-
sition, and all stnooth intermediate cases. Models of this type have been discussed by
Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and Lin and Terasivirta (1994). though the te.st for
transition from 1(0) to I( 1), developed in this section, is new.
In the tirst-order autoregressivc framework of (i), if the final state is differenee-
stationarity. about which there seems little dispute in the literature, then [i, + pT ^ '-
This constraint will be imposed in our subsequent analysis. Level stationarity in tbe
initial state implies lp,|< 1, Assuming p, + p2 = ' ' then (I) can be rewritten as
(V, - S , ( Y . T ) v v _ | ) = a , + a 2 S , ( y , x ) + P | ( > v - i " S,Ci,i)y, . , ) + e, . ( 2 )
To test the null hypothesis that y, is I( I) throughout against a transition in y, from 1(0)
to 1(1) with drift, the relevant hypotheses are
//,,:P, = I , / / , :|5, < I .
As there is little reason to suspect long-term drift in the later, difference stationary,
period, we also consider the same test, but constraining the drift to be zero, that is,
for a transition from a stationary first-order autoregression with non/ero tnean to a
random walk with no drift. In this ease a, + a^ = 0 so that model (2) becomes
,) + e, . (3)
The null and alternative hypotheses involving p, are as above.
The appropriate test of//„ versus H^ in both models is based on the /-statistic for
testing p] = 1; that is.
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where |5| is the (nonlinear) least sqtiares estimator of [i, in (2) or (3), 'fo obtain criti-
cal values for these test statistics, we sintulaled tinder (be null bypothesis from ibc
random walk model
witb e, generated as ///.) N(O,I), Models (2) and (3) were fitted lo this process by
nonliitear least squares (NLS), earc being taken to ensure that global ratber than local
minima were found tbrough tbe use of a grid of starting valties (or i. Because mod-
els (2) and (3) are linear in the a and [i parameters, when estimating, following Ley-
bourne. Newbold and Vougas (1998). we are able to speed tip the convergence of the
optimization algorithm by concentrating the sum of squares funetion with respect to
(bcse parameters. Thus tiie NLS estimation probient reduces to ntinimi/ing the sum
of squares function with respect to the (wo parameters y and f. Given the greater
volatility in the early part of tbese interest rate series compared to tbe postbreak
years, particularly for the United States, we also simulated critical values assuming
heteroskedastieity under the null hypothesis. Specifically these eritieal values were
simulated under the Ttull bypothesis IVom random walk series of I,3().S observations,
witb variaticeof C; in the first 34 percent of the satnple tbree times that in the linal 66
percent of" the sample, (Our analysis suggests that for tbe U,S. weekly series the most
likely abrupt break is 34 pereent of tbe way tbnuigh, with residtial variances approx-
imately of ratio 3:1.) Of course, these critical values are only directly relevant lor the
model estimated tor these data, so in Table I we prcseiu btith sels of critical values at
tbe 0.10. 0.05, and 0.01 signilicanee levels for bolh the tests (uneonstrained dritt and
drift constrained to zero), calctilated trom tivc thousand replications.''
When calculating the iest statistics for eacb inicrest rate series, lathcr than wt>rk-
ing witb (be raw data, we corrected for any potential dynamic misspecilication in the
model (2) or (3) by application of nn atitoregressive tiller to the dat;i prior to the
modeling, Tbe tilter we tised involved tirst estimating by ordinary least squares the
autoregression
(l. F o r iliL' N t , S c s i i n t [ i i i o [ i h e r e a m i t h r n u g h o t i i o t i r Mjuilysis w e c i i ip lovL ' t l U K ' O P T M t J M s t i t i n i t i l t n c
l i h n t r y iil" ( i , ' \ t l , S S , ^ , 1 , T h e c f i l i c a l vLtltics i t iv \ i i - l t i i i l ly idci i l iL 'al l o t S L T I O S ol" ^2'-) n u i n l h l y ;iiut ! . 3 ( ) 5
w e e k l y o b s f r \ ' a l i ( > n s . W e a l s o s i m t i l a l c d i n i i o \ ' a l i o i i s f rn i i i a l i e a \ y - l a i l e J i l i s l r i h t i l i i i n , S lL ide i i l ' s / w i l t i 5
d e j i t r e ^ III' I ' l c c d o m . I l i i s h a d [i i iL-ghgi t i lo i n i p a c i o n i h c criiiLLiI \;ilttL-s. S t i h s c t | t i c n i l > \ s o a i lovvoi l l o r
d y n a m i c s b y i n l n t d u c i i i g l a g s . W e l o t i i i d t h a i I h i s e l a h o r a i i o i i nl i h c i r s i h a s o n l y a n i i i d e s t i m p a c t o n I h c
critical values.
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We tben defined v, - X ^i, '-^^ ^'"'' ^^ r^ies to be modeled and estimated the models
(2) and (3) using tbe filtered data _v, in place of y,.^  Treating the auttjcorrelation dy-
namics in this way ensures that tbe asymptotic null distribution of the test statistic is
unchanged. Moreover, since nuisance parameters are easily eliminated through ordi-
nary least squares estimation of tbe autoregression in first differences, only modest
additional computation is involved in sitnulations, tbrough which we were able to
verify tbat the critical values of Table I remain appropriate for sample sizes of inter-
est. Table 2 provides tbe calculated test statistics and estimated parameters for each
transition model.
Comparing Table 2 with Table I, for monthly U.S. short-term nominal interest
rates over the period 1890:1 to 1934:1. using the critical values simulated under the
assumption of heteroskedastic error terms, we can reject the null of no transition
from 1(0) to 1( 1) for all of our models at tbe 5 percent level of significance. This is so
irrespective of whether or not we incorporate dummy variables in the model for
points of data irregularity.^ Even stronger rejections are obtained, at the I percent
significance level, wben U.S, weekly data beginning in 1909 are used. Note, how-
ever, that irrespective of wbicb critical values are used, for U.K, monthly short-term
nomina! interest rates over the period 1890:1 to 1934:1. unequivocally we cannot re-
jcct the Kl) null hypothesis. Thus, we find, along witb previous authors, very strong
evidence of transition from level stationarity to difference stationarity for ibe United
States. However, evidence for such a transition in the U.K, interest rate series is not
significant, even at tbe 10 percent level, so that our analysis fails to reveal strong
7, For Ihc U,S, weekly, U,.S, monthly, and the U,K, monllily series, using Ihe general to specitic test-
in" methodology at the 10 pereent level ol" signiikanee we identilied k - 5. k = 211, and k • 24. respee-
tiCeiv Hor ihe U S montlilv series we also considered the possibility of elaborating our model by
incoiporatine 0-1 dummv variables lor tbe moiubs l')()7:l 1, 1907:12, and I9O8;1. which were severely
allected by ibc financial a a s h of 1907, 1 ,ike Fishe and Wohar (1990) and Fishe (1991) we tind ibat sea-
sonal dummy variables takiri!! Ihe same value across Ibc sample bave no mipacl on tbe location or speed
of tbe sirucitiral breaks found asing our models. For Ihis reason we present results excluding seasona
dummies We also experimented wiib seasonal dummy variables Ibal look dillercni values in tbe early and
lale periods in tbe manner of Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (I9S7), However tbis metbodology involves an
arbitrary decision as to wbat subsamples should be used to calculate Ibc dummy variables, and none ot
these lypes of models olTer an inerease in explanatory power over models excludmg seasonal dummy
variables but including addilional stalistieally signitieanl dynamics.
8 For calculalion of Ihe test slalislic wiib U.S, monlbly data, rbe relevant transition models were esti-
mated witb dummy variables included lor observations 19117:11,1907:12, and 1908:1, tbese observalions
being severely affeeied by the linaneial crasb of 1907, It is widely acknowledged tbal some oI Ihe U,S,
monthly data'is subject lo heing contaminaled witb measurement ernir. For certain monlbs m Ihe years
1901 r907, 1910. and 1918. usury laws imposed a ceiling on the reported interest rales meanmg tbat Ibc
rates reporicd in ihesc vears were' nol llic true market elearing interesl rates. Wbile we report results m-
eludini; only dummy variables for observations 1907:11,1907:12, and 1908:1. uicorporatuig dummy vari-
ables int(i our models lor observaiions wiib measuremeni error did not alter Ibc timing of the cstimaled
transition, or tbe general conclusions of sialistical support for a break of tbis type m ibc U,S series- or tbe
linding of no sucb break in tbe U,K, series, Tbis is consisleni witb Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1990) wbo
in Iheir response to Fisbe and Wobar (1990), inelude dummy variables to aeeount tor suspeet dales, and
find lillle cbange in tbeir break poinl. Mankiw, Miron. and Weil (I9<X)) write. -Tbere is no evidence ihal
any oC Ibe resulls we reporlcd are atiributable lo measuremeni error" (p. 978), See Fisbe and Wobar (19911)
lor more dclails on tbe issue of measuremeni error in Ibese series.
IV\ii|. NKVMiOI I), sri:i'lli:N,l. I.LYIKltkM:. kOBIiRrSDLLIS, ANDMAkK h. WOllAk . 24*
TABLti I
S i M i ' i A^rij) C 'Rr r iCAi V . A H D ' S I ' l ik S I K I ( i i K A I C i i . ' \N(}h
1 pereent -4,403 4.145 -5.194 -4.907
5 percent 3.777 • 3.611 4.622 -4,376
10 pereeni 3,74K 3.361 4,568 4.128
Mo i l •,: r (L- ruut . -u iu iLL ia i l.iri'i- ^,l l l l |)l.• I T I I K . I I \ , I U I L ' ' i i l I IK- k-sl ^ u i l i . i i i . ,L^•,LLllll^l•; Li iuki [{»• mi l l liy|n>lliL'>.i>. lii.Ll ciEur kTi i i - . . in- III> sl;iii
,l:iEd 11OIE11.ll. I'll) l.lflHill.-s SE1E11IILE|L-(I klU'i-' ..EEI)[lk' i-EllliMl \, l l l l^•^ , i | l i l t l^ .•^ l >t. l t l . [ lL-!. l -Mll l l l l lL ' . l l lul .T iliL' IIElll I l \p i l l lu -M- llKEt f lEdl ICri l l- i l l
iiuEiii^illy i.li\[iihEik'J vvnii \.iiiaESLL- IEJ IIIL- I I IS I ' 4 pi ' ici- i i l o\ l\n- ..lEiipli' Ihu-u l i i t i i ' ' l l i : i l iii Ilio i i i i i i l W> [ H T J C I I I i i i l l n ' s.Lni|ik'.
TABU-2
l : , S ' i ' I M A T h n P . \ K A . \ 1 l - r [ , R , S . \ M ) C \ I . C I I \ l I . i l / T l S I h O k S i K l (. I I k \ 1 C l l A
Ur)iicd,Slales. 1890:1 19-34:1. (m)
Uniled States. 1890:1 19.34:1, (m)
a, I U; = 0
Uniled Slaies, 1890:1 -1934:1. (m)
Dummies
United Slates, 1890:1 -1934:1. (ml
Dtminnes. a, I a> -• 0
Uniled Stales, 1909:1 19.14:1. (w)
United .Slaies. 1909:1 I9.W:I, (wi
a, + a. -- 0
United Kingdom. 1890:1-1934:1, (m) -,154
(.078
United Kingdom, 1890:1-1934:1. (m) .1-54
a, I a^ ^ 0
mi i i i i l iN 1M07 I I , | i | ( (7 i : , EEiid I ' lOS : ! • , , iu l "dL-ii.>k'M!;EiilELiEiiLt EIE lllL•"^ [VK-rEi i .>,i.l I I X ' H . - I K L - V L - K , r c i U - E E ^ d ' , S[ .m[ l , in l ' , •J • |u l^ , i a ' i n
evidence against the pfoposiiion thai U.K. interest faics were ditTcrencc stationary
over the entire period.''
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3. I lSTIMATlNGTHi; S'iRUCTtlRAL C'llANCii'; IN U.S. SIIORT-TliRM NOMINAL INTHRCST
RATIOS
In section 2 our tests fail lo find sfning support fot" the hypothesis that a .structural
change from 1(0) to 1(1) occurred at ali in U.K. Inleresi rates over the period
y. An ai ldi i ional e h e e k on ihe val idi ty of o u r f indings tor ilie L',K. s e i i e s w a s ea r r i cd oul by e s t i m a t i n g
our i i iodeK wi th Ihe expone i i i in the logis t ic funet ion reversed . In ihis ease o u r res t r ic t ion [3, I | i , 1
l u i c c s the m o d e l to be l( 1) at the start n!' the se r ies and o u r s t anda rd lest hec i i tucs o n e of Ihe null hypdt l i -
cs i s that the m o d e l r e m a i n s at l( I) aga ins i an a l ie rna t ive h y p o i h e s i s thai ai soti ie point t he re is a t rans i t ion
to 1(0). r i i i s variaiii r evea led no additi(iiiai s tat ist ical e v i d e n c e agains t ilic l( 11 null h y p o t h e s i s for ihc U ,K .
ser ies .
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1890:1-1934:1. In this section of our empirical analysis we concentrate on ihe U.S.
series. Here and in the following section, we report results on U.S, weekly data, be-
ginning in 1909. In fact, very similar results were found for U,S. monthly data over
the period 1890:1 -1934:1. A detailed analysis of tbis montbly series is given by Sol-
lis (1999).
To determine tbe timing and speed at which tbe structural change in U.S. short-
term nominal interest rates occurred, we used the approacb outlined in section 2, es-
timating models with and without any constraints on the drift a, + a, in (1) and (2).
Tbe model specifications are
• I ' ' ' ' I - I
for unconstrained drift, and for drift constrained to be (),
(v - .S ' (7X)v ,) = a , ( l - 5 , ( T , I : ) ) + 3 I { V , . - SAy.x)\) , )+X^^Av, . . , +1:, (5)
with, as in tbe previous section, ^ = 5 in both models. In each case, tben, tbe con-
straint p, + p2 = I isimposedon(l), inline with the evidence of lbe previous sec-
tion of a transition from 1(0) to 1(1). Equations (4) and (5) provide a sligbtly different
approacb here, wbere tbe empbasis is on estimation rather than testing (as was tbe
case in section 2), to the incorporation of dynamics into (2) and (3). For tbe present
purposes, it is convenient to express tbe model lo be estimated as a single equation,
using tbe raw, ratber tban the transformed, data. Tbe results obtained in this section
are, as we shall see, entirely compatible with tbose of tbe previous section.
Figure I sbows the estimated transition, from a nonlinear least squares fit for the
constrained drift model. [Virtually identical results were obtained for tbe uncon-
strained model (4)]. The estimated transition is virtually instantaneous, occurring in
June 1917. As reported in SoUis (1999) a similar analysis of montbly data frotn
1890:1-1934:1 also generates a best estimate of an altnost instantaneous transition
in June 1917. The only apparent difference of substance between results for the two
data sets is tbat while Sollis reports an estimate of 0.74 for tbe dominant autoregres-
sive paratneter in tbe pretransition period, as can be seen from Figure I tbe corre-
sponding value for the bigher frequency data is 0.93. Because 0.93^ -= 0.75, these
estimates from weekly and monthly data are certainly not incompatible. Wbile our
results for weekly data and for monthly data covering a longer time period are in
agreement, tbey differ from those of Mankiw, Miron, and Wei! (1987), wbo also used
a logistic switching model, estimating a transition, using monthly data, that is essen-
tially completed between December 1914 and June 1915. We can acbieve the same
results for tbose data by dropping the dynamics—that is, the tertns in lagged firsl dif-
ferences in (4), It is the inclusion of these terms, tben, that accounts for the differ-
ences in our point estimates and those of Mankiw, Miron, and Weil. However, it must
P A t L , \ I : \ V B ( ) I . D , , S I I : P H F N , I l . f ' . Y I U H R N I : , R O I S L R T S O I l . i S , A N D M A R K h. W O H A R
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be stressed that the analysis of this secticMi does not statisticaily excltide an earlier
transition us a possibility.
The estimated transitions reported in this scctioti are tu>nlinear least squares point
estimates. In Figure 1 we teport as our best estiinale ;t very rapid Iransiiion in tnid-
1917. However, as yet we have not attached uncertainty measures to this estimate,
which does not. for exampic, exclude on statistical grounds the possibility of an ear-
lier or less rapid transition, fhis issue is explored in the following section.
4, A C;R1D SI'ARCH ANALYSIS OK POTION IIAL PARAMIiTfiR I RANSITIONS
In our final empirical sectioti we tnake a more detailed cotiipari.son of the U.S. and
U,K, interest rate series, from the perspective of estimating parameter transition,s to
capture potential struclurai changes from 1(0) io 1(1), Specifically, we fit transition
models fo both scries atid determitie the set of parameter values (y.x)—that is, speed
of transition and transition tnidpoint—that cannot he excluded by likelihood ratio
tests. Here we report resulLs for the U.S. weekly series beginning in 1909."' In sec-
tion 2 we noted ihe lack of strong evidence of any such transition for the U,K, series.
Nevertheless, failure to reject a null hypothesis (of no transition) does not necessar-
ily conslitutc sirong evidetice in favor of that hypothesis, so a transition tiiodel is es-
timated for the LJ.K, data. In section 3 we noted that our best estimate for the U,S.
Id, Hov'.ovei. So l l i s 11999) liiids c o m p a r a b l e coi ic l i ts idi is tor the U . S , mon th ly scr ies ove r the w h o l e
per iod 189(1 1934, In par t icular , tho sha rp d i s t inc t iun in in fe rence ahuu i the L' .S. and IJ,K, interest rate
t ime se r i e s that will he r epo r t ed in th i s si,-i.tiiin hd ld s , whichcM^T iif the t w o U , S , ser ies is a n a l v / e d .
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series is a very rapid transition in June 1917, but it is important to assess what other
possibilities cannot be excluded on statistical grounds.
Working with our tnost general model, given by equation (2), we augment to ex-
plicitly take account of higher-order autocorrelations giving model (4), which is tben
estitnated by nonlinear least squares. As before, in that model we set k = 5 tor the
U.S. weekly series and k = 24 for the U.K. tiiontbly series. Tben for each series we
calculate the sum of squared errors (SSE) over a grid allowing y to range from .005 to
5 in steps of .005 and x front. 1 to .9 in steps of ,01, tninimizing SSE, or equivalently
maximizing the Gaussian likelihood, for the remaining parameters in the model at
each point on the grid. Note that increasing the range of y beyond 5 leads to no infor-
mation gain because at tbis stage the iransition is already virtually instantaneous.
Defining tbe natural log of the likelihood function at the global maximum over
(y,x) as /^|(y|,i:|) and the log of the maximized likelihood function at any other point
(yy,Xi,) as /:Q(yo,Xi|), then at each point in our grid search we obtain a different L^ for
each different y,T combination. Assuming that / = 2{L^ - L,,) has a chi-squared dis-
tribution with 2 degrees of freedom under (y,!) = (y,,,Xo), the set of all y,x combina-
tions that cannot be rejected at tbe 5 percent significance level can be obtained by
locating the y,T values such that / < 5.99. Tbese sets are graphed as Ftgure 2, witb
the dashed and solid lines indicating the computed sets lor tbe U.K. and U.S. series,
respectively. Rather than graph the transition speed y (that has little intuitive inter-
pretation) against x, we convert y into the approximate time tbat it takes for 90 per-
cent of the transition process to be completed (45 percent eitber side of the midpoint
T). using for monthly (weekly) data the approximate conversion formula 90 percent
transition in montbs (weeks) - (6/y). This approximation appears to work well over
tbe range of values considered here.
From Figure 2. for the U.S. short term nominal interest rate, the acceptable transi-
tion midpoints x range from October 1914 to January 1918. wbile in terms of the
transition speed, we can accept speeds from instantaneous to 7.7 years for 90 percent
of the transition to be completed. Yet it can be seen on the same graph that for tbe
United Kingdom we can accept midpoints earlier than 1909, and eitber very fast
transitions or extremely slow transitions with 90 pereent of the transition taking one
hundred years. This huge range of acceptable parameter combinations for the United
Kingdom is compatible with the analysis of section 2, that suggested only weak evi-
dence for any transition in this series.
As an aid to interpreting Figure 2, in Figures 3 and 4 we plot the estimated beta
transition (^ <1 to 1) that maximizes the likelihood function, and for comparison
the transition of p, < 1 to I that is consistent with a y at the highest point of the ae-
t! For example with our tnonlhly data, when 7 = ,23. 90 perceni complclinn ocetirs in two years
(twenty-four months), when y = 5. 9() percent completion occurs in 1 month. Our formula gives that tor
these Y values 90 percent of completion occurred in 24 months and I -2 months, respectively, Ot eourse .
we atlow in these calculations tor the higher frequency of the U,S, data, and report tor comparabthty niitri-
her of years lor 90 percent completion of transitton. To verify ihat our miidel was approprtate over the
whole sample span, we calculated residual autocorrelations for the periods before and after our best estt-
mates of the transition midpoints, 'f hese were small, giving no evidence ol serious misspeeiiicatton o! the
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ceptance set (a slower transition), but with the same x value as for the transition that
maximizes the likelihood function. From Figure 3, it can be seen that the transition
that generates the maximum value of the likelihood function for the U.S. series is
virtually instantaneous, starting from June 1917. Alternatively the bulk of the transi-
tion consistent wilh a y from the edge of the acceptable y,T set but with the same tnid-
point (the slowest iransition we can accept), lakes place between 1914 and 1921.
As shown in Figure 4, for the United Kingdom, the transition that maxitnizes the
value of the likelihood function again occurs quickly, in this case in June 1915. The
slowest transition we cannot reject (with the same midpoint) is simply an upward-
sloping line that in fact starts from .88 in 1890. reaches .91 by 1909, and .96 by the
linal observation. It can be seen that for the U.K. series we cannot reject an ex-
tretnely slow iransition that is nol fully completed within the sample.
Clearly in terms of estimating structural change in the form of parameter transi-
tions, the U.S. and U.K. short-term interest rate series are fundamentally different.
While at the 5 percent level of significance for ihe U.S. we cannot reject parameter
transitions with midpoints between 1914:10 and 1918:1, this period being a good
candidate for a ''transitional period" in terms of the historical evidence discussed in
Ihe introduction, iransitions that are extremely slow can be rejected. For the United
Kingdom at the 5 percent level of significance there is a much wider range of tnid-
poinls that cannot be rejected and in terms of transitional speed we cannot reject the
slowest feasible transition, or the fastest. Thus for the U.K. series if a transition is es-
timated in spite of the test outcomes of section 2, then our statistically acceptable re-
sults tell us altnost any type of break might have occurred^we cannot find strong
support for any specific type of break, and the hypothesis of no break is in this sense
further supported.
I'AdI NLWROin. STF-:PIII,N.I l.l-.YB()rRM,,R()BhRTSI)LLIS,ANDM\RKh: WOHAK : 24')
CONCl.tiSION
In this paper we have presented evidence on ihree iinportanl empirical issues re-
garding structural changes from 1(0) lo 1(1) in U.S. and U.K. short-lerm nominal in-
terest rates over lbe period 1890:1 to 1934:1. Those issues are as follows: whelher
slriietural breaks in these series do occur; if striieUiral breaks do ciccur Iben wben do
they most likely take place and how quickly are they completed: and finally whal
types of breaks cannot be slatistically rejected for each series. Given questions about
data reliability in the early years, we report an analysis of weekly U.S. data begin-
ning in 1909. The fact thai similar conclusions emerge from analyses of the U.S.
monthly .series and a higher frequency series covering a shorter lime span strength-
ens the eredibility of our resulis. Developing a new testing procedure for a transition
from an 1(0) to an 1( I) proeess, we find tbal we can nnequiv(.)eally reject the null hy-
pothesis that tbe U.S. inlerest rale series is I( I) ihroughoul the sample period in favor
of the hypothesis that a strticlural ehange from 1(0) to l( I) occurred. For the U.K. se-
ries we cannol rejecl the KI) null hypothesis, even al the 10 percent level of signifi-
cance. Our results indicate that our best estimate is ibat a rapid siriiciLiral change
from 1(0) to 1(1) occurred in U.S. nominal inlerest rates in mid-1917.
While we find a different dale for the most likely siructural break in U.S, interest
rates to Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987) and therefore Iind little ,siipporl for their
conclusion Ihat it was the founding of ihe Federal Reserve System in 1914 ihat
caused lhc transition from 1(0) lo I( I), historical evidence suggests lhal the Fed did
play a part in the strueiiiral ehange. In June 1917 financial amendments were passed
by President Wilson wbicb not only helped to finance the participation of Ihe Uniied
States in World War I, bnt also greatly increased the flexibility of the Federal Re-
serve. The Amendments alk)wed ihe Fed, through Ihe district banks, lo operate a
mt)re flexible monetary policy. This monetai-y policy was much more likely lo have
had the effect of causing a structural change in Ihe sloehasiic bebavior of short-term
nominal interest rales of lbe type observed than anything tbat bappened pi'ior to the
Amendments of 1917.'"
Our results indicate tbal for tbe United Kingdom we fail to Iind strong evidence
supporting any particular type of strtictural ebange. or indeed of any change at all. In
fact our results indicate tbat we cannot rejeei the proposition thai U.K. interest rates
are difference stalionary over the entire period 1890-1934. There appears to be good
eeonomie juslification for this finding. While the Uniied Kingdom was slill on ihe
gold siandard in the early 19()()s, Goodfriend (1988) has shown Ihat a central bank
can smooth interest rates even undci- a gold standard. Hence, the Bank of England
could well have been smoothing interest rates prior lo the (bunding of the Federal
Reserve in 1914. resulting in the difference-stationary bebavior of the U.K. interest
I'ate series.
12. I'or a more cleliiiiciJ discussion ofihcsc Aniciidnifnls. si.\' FIshc (I'WI).
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In conclusion, we cannot support Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987) in their argu-
ment that the founding of the Fed alone represented a new economic regime, or the
proposition of Barsky et al. (1988) that in sotne way the Fed caused a structural break
in U.K. interest rates. There is strong historical evidence in the fortn of the 1917 Fi-
nancial Amendments to suppoil our econometric evidence that a structural break in
U.S. short-tenn nominal interest rates most likely took place in June 1917. At this
date the power of the Federal Reserve System was increased sufficiently to allow
them to operate a successful interest rate-smoothing policy. The new regime might
reasonably be dated frotii this point in the United States, though, as might be ex-
pected, no similar evidence for such a rapid impact on U,K. interest rates i,s apparent.
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